The Impact of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague on Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law by Williams, W. Clark, Jr.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 3 Article 3
1983
The Impact of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague on
Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law
W. Clark Williams Jr.
University of Richmond
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Insurance Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law
Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
W. C. Williams Jr., The Impact of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague on Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 17 U. Rich. L. Rev. 489
(1983).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss3/3
THE IMPACT OF ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. v. HAGUE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF
LAW
W. Clark Williams, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of constitutional limitations on choice of law
by the United States Supreme Court has turned primarily on the
due process clause1 and the full faith and credit clause2 of the
United States Constitution.' In theory at least, each constitutional
provision rests upon separate grounds. The full faith and credit
clause, as it applies to public acts, would compel a forum state
under appropriate circumstances to honor the sovereignty of a for-
eign state in the federal system and to apply the law of the foreign
state whose interests are sufficiently compelling.4 The due process
* Associate Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A.
1971, Brown University; J.D. 1974, Vanderbilt University.
The author wishes to thank Carol L. Wingo, Class of 1983, for the excellent research
which she contributed to this article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without the due process of law ......
2. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof."
3. To a limited extent, the privileges and immunities and equal protection clauses have
also placed constitutional limitations on a forum court's choice of law decisions. The privi-
leges and immunities clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, provides, "The Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." See also
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, which provides, "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
The equal protection clause, U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, provides, "No State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
In the choice of law context, these clauses have been construed as prohibiting a forum
court from applying forum law in a manner which discriminates against a party because of
nonresidence, with no rational basis. For an excellent treatment of these clauses in choice of
law cases, see Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:
Equal Protection, 28 U. CHi. L. REV. 1 (1960) and Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional
Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323
(1960). See also Note, Unconstitutional Discrimination in Choice of Law, 77 COLUM. L.
Rav. 272 (1977). This article will not explore these limitations.
4. See Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62
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clause limits the power of a state to give extraterritorial effect to
its own laws in a manner which is unfair or unreasonable, given the
relationship between that state, the parties, and the transaction
being sued upon.5
Unfortunately, the development of these two doctrines and their
impact on constitutional restrictions on choice of law over the last
fifty years has been at times both inconsistent and confusing. If
read broadly enough, either of the two clauses could deal function-
ally with most choice of law limitations issues.' But since the
1930's, the Supreme Court has chosen to develop the scope of both
clauses in this area in parallel lines of cases, not always with clarity
as to the reason for choosing to rest a particular decision on one
clause instead of the other.7 During this process, the Court has
struggled to arrive at an acceptable standard which is unambigu-
ous in its meaning and application.
This article will trace the development of the limitations on
choice of law imposed by the Court through the due process
clause8 and the full faith and credit clause.9 As will be seen, the
Court during this period made tentative movements toward devel-
oping a doctrine which would have been tantamount to a uniform
federal choice of law rule under the auspices of full faith and
credit 0 before finally retreating to a less restrictive standard. The
gradual erosion of distinctions between the two doctrines' applica-
tions has now reached a point at which the differences are insignif-
icant for most purposes.1 The Court's most recent decision in this
CORNELL L. REV. 94, 110 (1976); Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61
CORNELL L. REV. 185, 192 (1976); see also Jackson, Full Faith and Credit - The Lawyer's
Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1945).
5. See Kirgis, supra note 4, at 95; Martin, supra note 4, at 190.
6. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 80 (1982); see also Weintraub, Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IOWA L. REV. 449,476
(1959).
7. Part of the reason for this confusion seems to be a reluctance by the Supreme Court to
identify clearly the different focuses of the two clauses in the choice of law area. See Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 321 nn.4-6 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also R.
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 5, 55 (3d ed. 1977).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 46-81.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 15-45.
10. R. LEFLAR, supra note 7, at § 55.
11. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 308 n.10; see also Martin, supra note 4, at
186: "When the question is limited to choice of law in cases not yet reduced to judgment
... the only apparent significant distinction between the two clauses is that due process




field, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,"2 unfortunately, creates
problems in assessing the true status of the standards which have
developed, both because of the absence of a clear majority posi-
tion13 and because of the troublesome application of the standard
by the justices comprising the plurality view.14
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Full Faith and Credit
Most of the significant Supreme Court decisions regarding full
faith and credit to public acts have arisen in the context of work-
men's compensation cases. Although the Court had previously dis-
cussed due process limitations on choice of law,' 5 Bradford Electric
Co. v. Clapper,'6 decided in 1932, represented one of the earliest
treatments of the full faith and credit issue. A Vermont resident
had been hired by a Vermont utility company to do maintenance
work, and while on temporary assignment in New Hampshire, he
was killed. His administratrix brought a negligence action against
the employer in New Hampshire state court. However, the Ver-
mont workmen's compensation statute provided that the exclusive
remedy for injured workers was provided under the statute, while
New Hampshire law provided the employee with an election to sue
the employer for negligence. The United States Supreme Court
held that the New Hampshire courts were required to give full
faith and credit to the Vermont statute and that the negligence
action was barred by the terms of that "public act.' 7 Dismissing
the significance of the fact that the employee was killed in New
Hampshire and any interest this arguably might give New Hamp-
shire in applying its own statute, the Court reasoned that the fo-
rum court could refuse to honor a foreign cause of action only if it
were obnoxious to the public policy of the forum state.'" The Court
12. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
13. See infra note 87.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 107-26.
15. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); see also infra text accompanying
notes 46-55.
16. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
17. Id. at 162.
18. Thus, a plaintiff suing in New Hampshire on a statutory cause of action arising in
Vermont might be denied relief because the forum fails to provide a court with juris-
diction of the controversy ... or because the enforcement of the right conferred
would be obnoxious to the public policy of the forum .... But the mere fact that
the Vermont legislation does not conform to that of New Hampshire does not estab-
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found that New Hampshire's interest as the place of injury was
only "casual,"' 19 while Vermont, as the residence of both parties
and the seat of the employment relation, had a greater connection
with the cause of action. However, no analysis of policies was
made, and no weighing of interests occurred; rather, the Court
gave rigid application to the mandate of full faith and credit and
the compulsion upon New Hampshire to honor Vermont's statute.
The Supreme Court decided Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Accident Commission0 three years later, again facing the issues of
full faith and credit entitlement by a foreign statute. This case
presented the Court with a conflict between two workmen's com-
pensation statutes, each of which provided that it would be the
exclusive remedy for an injured employee.2 A nonresident alien
entered into an employment contract in California with a Califor-
nia employer to work for the company in Alaska and agreed to be
bound by Alaska's Workmen's Compensation Act. After being in-
jured in Alaska, the employee returned to California and there
filed a claim against his employer with the California Industrial
Accident Commission. The employer sued to set aside the award to
the employee on the ground that the Alaska act provided his exclu-
sive remedy and must be afforded full faith and credit by the Cali-
fornia court. The Supreme Court affirmed the refusal of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court to honor the Alaska statute as a defense to
the employee's award.22
The Supreme Court initially noted that a forum state need not
always give full faith and credit to a sister state's law, inasmuch as
this practice would lead to the "absurd result"23 that in every con-
flict of laws case, the forum state's law would be applied only in
the foreign state. The majority, speaking through Justice Stone,
then set forth the proposition that full faith and credit requires an
appraisal of the "governmental interests of each jurisdiction, '24
and compels application of a foreign state's law only when the in-
lish that it would be obnoxious to the latter's public policy to give effect to the Ver-
mont statute ....
Id. at 160-62. Cf. Weintraub, supra note 6, at 469.
19. Clapper, 286 U.S. at 162.
20. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
21. Id. at 544-45.
22. Id. at 547.
23. Id.
24. Id. See Kirgis, supra note 4, at 113.
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terests of that state outweigh those of the forum. 5
The majority did invoke the "obnoxiousness test" of Clapper,26
viewing the California Supreme Court's holding as evidence that
the Alaska act was obnoxious to California policy. 27 But it is signif-
icant that the Court in Alaska Packers focused on a different
theme in articulating a standard for full faith and credit to public
acts. Far from indulging a presumption that full faith and credit
must be accorded a foreign statute absent a showing of obnox-
iousness, the Court indicated that a forum law which is constitu-
tional is "prima facie" applicable in a choice of law case.28 And the
Court seemed to reserve for itself the ultimate duty of weighing
the interests of the affected states and deciding whether the bal-
ance dictated full faith and credit entitlement by the foreign
state's statute.
It has been argued that the Court after Alaska Packers had
positioned itself on the verge of developing a uniform, federal rule
for making choice of law decisions - at least in domestic conflicts
cases - under the auspices of the full faith and credit clause.2"
From the standard articulated in Alaska Packers, it was not a
large step to holding that the one state whose interests in having
its law applied were superior to a "competing state's" interests was
constitutionally entitled to have its law chosen for application.30
But there were problems with this approach. Among them were
the difficulties in identifying and assigning proper weight to the
various interests of each state concerning an issue, particularly
when the legislature and courts of the state had previously been
silent with respect to those interests and policies regarding their
25. Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547-48. Justice Stone noted in the majority opinion that,
since every state is prima facie entitled to enforce its own laws, the party seeking to chal-
lenge such application bears the burden of showing "that of the conflicting interests in-
volved those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum." Id. at 548.
26. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
27. It has been suggested that Justice Stone reformulated the "obnoxiousness test" intro-
duced in Clapper in the course of developing a weighing test in Alaska Packers. See R.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 520 (2d ed. 1980).
28. Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547.
29. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 7, § 56; see also D. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 204-38 (1963).
30. One feature of the standard for full faith and credit as it emerged from Alaska Pack-
ers was a test phrased in negative, rather than affirmative, terms: A forum court need not
extend full faith and credit to a foreign state's law unless that foreign state was shown to
have a superior interest. This "negative posture" of the standard for full faith and credit has
remained intact in Supreme Court decisions since Alaska Packers. See Allstate Ins. Co., v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); cf. Kirgis, supra note 4, at 120.
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own laws. 1 Moreover, the administrative burden on the Supreme
Court in providing guidance to state and lower federal courts in a
relatively unexplored field of law, may well have been a daunting
prospect.
Whatever the incentive, full faith and credit to public acts took
still another perceptible change in direction four years later in Pa-
cific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion.32 This case again saw the California Industrial Accident Com-
mission awarding recovery under a California statute despite the
statute's conflict with a Massachusetts workmen's compensation
statute purporting to provide the employee's exclusive remedy.
While the injury occurred on a job in California, however, this time
both the employer and employee were residents of Massachusetts.
The Supreme Court ruled that California need not give full faith
and credit to the Massachusetts statute, and upheld the California
court's application of its own workmen's compensation statute. It
did so in a fact situation notably close to the converse of that in
Alaska Packers, and the precise rationale of the opinion in Pacific
Employers was far from clear.33 The Court noted that California
had the absolute right to legislate its policy regarding workmen's
compensation and the availability of benefits to those injured in
California, and it mentioned that it would be "obnoxious" to that
policy to require denial of compensation to employees injured lo-
cally.3 4 The Court went on to identify the conflicting interests of
the two states - California's in providing compensation for em-
31. Of course, this problem is not unique to the constitutional limitations on choice of
law. It is indeed a troublesome aspect of the interest analysis approach to choice of law
decisions presently adopted in varying forms by most states. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra
note 6, at 39; see also Currie, The Constitution and Choice of Law, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 77
(1958); Jackson, supra note 4, at 16; cf. Fisher v. Huck, 50 Or. App. 635, 624 P.2d 177
(1981).
32. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
33. Justice Stone stated in the majority opinion:
While the purpose of [the full faith and credit clause] . . . was to preserve rights
acquired or confirmed under the public acts and judicial proceedings of one state by
requiring recognition of their validity in other states, the very nature of the federal
union of states . . . precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause as the means
for compelling a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes
Id. at 501.
34. Note the marked similarity of the factual setting in Pacific Employers to that in
Clapper, see supra text accompanying notes 16-19, and the similarity of the Massachusetts
exclusive remedy statute to that of Vermont in the Clapper decision. However, a contrary
finding of "obnoxiousness" was made in the Pacific Employers decision.
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ployees injured there and for local physicians and hospitals which
had treated those injured employees; and Massachusetts' in pro-
viding the measure of recovery for its injured residents and gov-
erning the liability and accountability of its resident employers.
But while it examined these interests, the Court did not identify
one set as superior.35 It held simply that full faith and credit did
not require a forum state to enforce a foreign state's policies and
thereby frustrate its own.
Even though the decision seemed to rest heavily on interest
identification, Pacific Employers left unanswered the question of
just how those interests were to be utilized in applying a standard
for constitutional limitation on choice of law. It was apparent that
the Court was moving away from the Clapper emphasis on the
need for the forum to show "obnoxiousness."" But just what
would have to be shown was left unclear.37
The evolution from a foreign-biased standard to a forum-biased
test for full faith and credit to public acts was apparent in the 1955
decision in Carroll v. Lanza,"s still another worker's compensation
case. The employee and his employer were residents of Missouri,
but the injury occurred on the job in Arkansas as a result of the
alleged negligence of the general contractor. The law of Missouri,
where the employment contract was executed, prohibited a negli-
gence action against a general contractor, declaring the employee's
exclusive remedy to lie under the workmen's compensation statute.
Arkansas, the forum state, provided for a recovery against a negli-
gent third party.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Arkansas court
in awarding the plaintiff a recovery against the general contractor
under Arkansas law,39 holding that Arkansas was not compelled to
give full faith and credit to the exclusive remedy statute of Mis-
35. Indeed, to do so would have been difficult, it seems.
36. Interestingly, however, this language reappears in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979),
in which the majority opinion notes that a Nevada sovereign immunity statute limiting
damages in a tort claim against the state would be "obnoxious" to the California forum's
policy. Id. at 424. But the Court went on to rest its decision upholding California's refusal of
full faith and credit to Nevada law upon a "substantial" California interest in protecting
residents injured on its highways. Id. at 424-27.
37. The requirement that comparative interests of affected states be weighed seems
clearly to have been abandoned in the subsequent decision in Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947). See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 6, at 91 n.10.
38. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
39. Id. at 413.
1983]
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souri. As in the opinions of Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers,
traces of "obnoxiousness" language were found in Carroll.40 But
the Court did not frame its analysis in terms of obnoxiousness, nor
did it compare the interests of the two states to determine which
was superior. Instead, the Court confined the focus of its decision
to identifying the "legitimate interest"'41 of the forum in providing
relief to persons injured in the state42 and the consequent need to
compensate for health care providers and family members, as well
as the injured party.43
After Carroll, the Supreme Court seemed to have established a
comparatively unrestrictive standard for assessing the strength of
the full faith and credit mandate for public acts. So long as it ap-
peared that the forum state had a "legitimate interest" in having
its law applied in contravention of a foreign state's law, it was free
to do so without full faith and credit infirmity. The rule of the
Clapper case was no longer the standard. That was not to say that
the place of injury, rather than the seat of the employment rela-
tion, must always be given full faith and credit. Rather, either
state would be permitted to apply its law, so long as it had a signif-
icant legitimate nexus with the cause of action and the issue to
which its law would be applied.44 And the Supreme Court would
not engage in a balancing of "competing interests" to determine
which of the interested states was constitutionally entitled to have
its law applied.45
40. The Court noted that Arkansas had not adopted "any policy of hostility to the public
Acts of Missouri." Id.
41. Id.
42. The Court described these interests as "large and considerable." Id.
43. The Court acknowledged, however, that these interests in protecting injured resi-
dents, assuring funds for local medical care, and preventing dependents of the injured party
from being left destitute were not pertinent for the forum in this case, since the injured
party had returned to Missouri and was not a burden to Arkansas or its institutions. None-
theless, the Court said, "[W]e write not only for this case and this day alone, but for this
type of case." Id.
44. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 7, § 57. While the line of cases discussed above dealt with
workmen's compensation, the principles developed there have been applied in most other
choice of law areas as well. There have been a few exceptions in certain fields, however,
notably those involving fraternal benefit societies. See Order of United Commercial Trav-
elers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947). See also R. Weintraub, supra note 27, at 524-27.
45. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court continued to adhere to the standard of per-
mitting a forum state with a significant contact and legitimate interests to refuse full faith
and credit to the laws of a sister state, but clouded its identification of the appropriate
standard by citing both Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers in support of its holding.
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 277-79 (1980).
496 [Vol. 17:489
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B. Due Process
The landmark Supreme Court decision utilizing due process as a
constitutional limitation on a state's choice of law was Home In-
surance Co. v. Dick.46 Decided in 1930, the Dick case set forth the
constitutional principle and interpretation from which present day
standards have evolved.47 Plaintiff Dick was a Texas resident who,
by assignment, had acquired rights to a fire insurance policy on a
tugboat. The policy was originally issued by a Mexican insurer to a
Mexican resident and covered the boat while it operated in Mexi-
can waters. The loss occurred in Mexico, and more than a year
later Dick brought suit in a Texas court against the Mexican insur-
ance company and two New York companies which had reinsured
the risk,48 to recover under the policy. The policy contained a
clause, permitted by Mexican law, which prohibited actions filed
more than one year after the date of the loss. However, Texas law
invalidated contract provisions limiting the right to sue on the con-
tract to less than two years. The Texas Supreme Court upheld
46. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
47. Prior to Dick, there were several decisions in the due process area that related to
choice of law. Perhaps most prominent in that group were three cases which involved dis-
putes over insurance contracts and in each of which Missouri was the forum state. In New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914), a policy provided by its terms that it should
be deemed issued in New York, the home state of the insurer. The insured had submitted
the policy application in Missouri, and later transferred the policy to his daughter living in
New Mexico. She then borrowed against the policy, and refused to repay the loan. Suit was
later brought in Missouri, and the Supreme Court refused to allow the forum court to com-
pel the insurer to pay the face amount of the policy due; instead, the company was permit-
ted to apply the reserve to discharge the loan pursuant to New York law. The Court rea-
soned that the law of the place of contracting, New York, must control. In New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918), again the Missouri court entertained suit on a policy
issued in New York, and again the Supreme Court held that Missouri could not apply its
own law, despite the fact that the insured was at all pertinent times a Missouri resident. In
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Leibing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922), the policy was issued in Missouri,
which also had other contacts with the transaction. Again, the Court upheld application of
the law of the place of contracting, this time the Missouri forum. Clearly in these decisions,
the Court viewed the choice of law decision as constitutionally mandated, although with the
exception of Dodge, the results were probably the same as if the substantial contacts test in
Dick had been applied. See infra text accompanying notes 48-54; see also Currie, supra note
31, at 30-41 (1958).
For other due process decisions prior to Dick, see Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (1900); St. Louis Cotton Compress
Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924).
48. Dick predicated jurisdiction over the defendants on a quasi-in-rem theory because of
their ownership of Texas property unrelated to the transaction sued upon. Such jurisdiction
would likely not be upheld today after Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), and Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
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judgment for the plaintiff, applying the Texas rule in contraven-
tion of the policy provision, which, the court said, offended Texas'
public policy.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the im-
position of Texas law upon these defendants to deprive them of a
contractual defense violated due process as an impermissible tak-
ing of a property right.49 The Court held that because "nothing in
any way relating to the policy sued on, or to the contracts of rein-
surance, was done or required to be done in Texas ... ,."0 the
Texas court had no power to apply its law to the parties or to the
contracts which formed the basis of the suit.51 Despite the jurisdic-
tional power of the Texas court to try the case, the lack of any
substantial connection between Texas and the cause of action at
issue rendered a choice of Texas law to govern the substantive is-
sues constitutionally impermissible.2
It has been argued that the Dick decision rests in part upon the
Court's recognition of the "unfair surprise" which was imposed
upon the insurance carriers by the attempted application of Texas
law.53 However, several factual details weaken this contention, in-
cluding the loss payable clause naming a Texas vessel owner, and
the need for the insurer to give written consent to assignment of
the policy to Dick, a Texas resident.5 4 Rather, the Dick case prop-
erly represents the Court's exercise of limitations on a state's arbi-
trary and unreasonable application of its own law in an extraterri-
torial fashion.55
49. Dick, 281 U.S. at 408.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 410.
52. The Texas Supreme Court attempted to justify the application of its limitations stat-
ute by characterizing the statute as procedural. However the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
this ruling, noting that inasmuch as the statute purported to eliminate a property (contract)
right of the insurers, it was substantive for purposes of this litigation, and due process rights
attached to it. Id. at 405-06.
One commentator has observed:
From the Dick decision it is suggested that the following rule may be distilled: If a
state does not have sufficient contact with the parties or with the facts to make it
reasonable for its law to be used in adjudicating a controversy arising between the
parties on those facts, application of the law of that state will violate the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.
Weintraub, supra note 6, at 455.
53. See Kirgis, supra note 4, at 108 n.53.
54. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 27, at 502-03. Weintraub develops the "unfair sur-
prise" argument in order to rebut it.
55. See Currie, supra note 31.
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Four years later the Supreme Court in Hartford Accident & In-
.demnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. 6 expanded the reach of the
due process limitation. Suit was brought in Mississippi to recover
on a surety bond contract executed in Tennessee, covering the
Mississippi employer's losses from embezzlement by employees.
The loss in question occurred in Mississippi. As in Dick, plaintiff
brought suit after the expiration of the contractually agreed upon
time limit for filing a claim. Such a contractual limitation was valid
in Tennessee but invalid in Mississippi. The Mississippi court ap-
plied its own law, struck down the contractual defense, and
awarded judgment to the plaintiff.57 Relying on Dick, the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that, without more contacts between Mis-
sissippi and the transaction than were apparent from the record,
such an application of Mississippi law to an extraterritorial trans-
action was an unconstitutional taking of a defendant's property
without due process of law. 8 Interestingly, however, the Court
placed all its emphasis on the place "where the contract was
made,"5 to the exclusion of other states' legitimate contacts and
interests with the transaction. As in Clapper,"° the Court's lan-
guage clearly indicated the potential for developing a nationwide
set of rules for choice of law purposes, deriving authority for this
doctrine from the due process clause. 1 But by focusing so intently
on this one "chosen contact," the Court lost sight of the fact that
Mississippi did have substantial and significant other contacts,
such as the plaintiff's domicile and the situs of the loss, thus ar-
guably giving it a reasonable relation to the contract. Therefore the
Delta case can be seen as a (fortunately) short-lived aberration of
due process as it recently had been articulated in Dick.2
In the 1954 decision of Watson v. Employers Liability Assur-
56. 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
57. Id. at 148-50.
58. Id. at 150. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 7, § 58.
59. For earlier decisions which had similarly invoked the "place of making" the contract
as the constitutional talisman, see supra note 47. This, of course, was the traditional choice
of law rule and remains in effect in many states today. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 27, at
349.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19 & 26.
61. A similar test was invoked at about the same time in the area of full faith and credit
in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). See supra text
accompanying notes 29-31.
62. It has been suggested that Delta would be decided differently if argued today. See R.
LEFLAR, supra note 7, § 58; E. ScoLEs & P. HAY, supra note 6, at 83.
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ance Corp.,63 the impact of due process on choice of law limitations
shifted again, moving back to the course originally charted by the
Dick case. Suit was brought in Louisiana by a Louisiana resident
against the liability insurance carrier for a hair-care manufacturer,
for personal injury sustained in Louisiana through the use of the
insured's products. Plaintiff's reliance on the Louisiana statute
permitting direct action against an insurer was challenged as being
a violation of due process, 4 since the insurance policy was neither
negotiated nor issued in Louisiana. 5
The Supreme Court upheld the direct action in Watson, despite
a provision in the insurance policy prohibiting such suits before a
liability judgment had been obtained against the insured.6 Distin-
guishing the case from both the Dick and the Delta due process
decisions, the Court noted that the injury in the case at bar had
occurred in the forum state, Louisiana, because of the use of the
insured's product there. As both the place of the tort and the in-
sured's domicile, Louisiana was found to have a legitimate interest
in protecting persons injured there,6 7 as well as a substantial con-
nection with the occurrence creating liability.,
Significantly, the Supreme Court in Watson chose not to require
the single factor of the "place of contracting"6' 9 to dictate a consti-
63. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
64. Id. at 76. The application of the statute was also challenged on full faith and credit
grounds. The Court disposed of this contention by relying essentially on the presence of the
same "contacts" and interests which were found to satisfy due process. Id. This decision
highlighted the similarity of the standards for the two constitutional limitations at that
time. See Speidel, Extraterritorial Assertion of the Direct Action Statute: Due Process,
Full Faith and Credit and the Search for Governmental Interest, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 179
(1958).
65. The policy was executed and delivered in Illinois and Massachusetts, and both states
upheld the validity of a policy provision forbidding a direct action. 348 U.S. at 68.
66. Id. at 72-73.
67. The majority opinion emphasized that the substantial nature of Louisiana's relation-
ship with the transaction distinguished the Watson case from both Dick and Delta. Id.
68. Justice Black clearly identified this connection:
Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are most likely to be Louisiana residents, and
even if not, Louisiana may have to care for them. Serious injuries may require treat-
ment in Louisiana homes or hospitals by Louisiana doctors. The injured may be des-
titute. They may be compelled to call upon friends, relatives, or the public for help.
Louisiana has manifested its natural interest in the injured by providing remedies for
recovery of damages. It has a similar interest in policies of insurance which are
designed to assure ultimate payment of such damages. ...
Id. at 72.
69. This was the traditional choice of law determinant, in effect in virtually all states at
the time Watson was decided. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 7, § 145; see also supra notes 47 &
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tutionally required choice of law decision.70 Instead, the Court
moved away from a view which would posit choice of law as a con-
stitutional matter and spoke to the interests and contacts of the
controlling state. As a result, the due process clause reacquired a
place as the limiting, rather than the decisionmaking, instrument
for choice of law purposes.
The Court was consistent in its view of the proper role of due
process in the choice of law arena when, ten years later, it decided
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.71 While residing in Illinois, Clay
had purchased an insurance policy against casualty or fire loss to
his personal property, then situated in Illinois. Subsequently, he
moved the property with him to Florida, where it was destroyed by
fire. More than one year after the loss occurred, the insured
brought suit on the policy in a federal district court in Florida. The
policy contained a provision barring suit more than one year after
a loss, and this clause was asserted as a defense by the insurer.
However, Florida law refused to recognize any such provision lim-
iting the time for filing suit to less than five years.7 2 The Supreme
Court held the application of Florida law to invalidate the policy
defense73 to be consistent with due process.
In declining to require application of Illinois law as urged by the
insurer, the Court again refused to seize upon a single predeter-
mined contact as imposing a choice of law decision upon the state
court. Despite the fact that the contract was made in Illinois, the
presence of the plaintiff and the insured property in Florida at the
time of the loss, facts known to the insurer,7 ' provided the forum
state with "ample" contacts75 to make the choice of Florida law
constitutionally permissible.76 As it had in Watson, the Court dis-
70. Arguably, the Court could have seized upon Louisiana as the "place of the tort," since
the injury took place there, and by this characterization given support to its constitutional
decision within the framework of traditional choice of law rules. Instead, the majority spoke
in terms of interests and connections.
71. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
72. This statute is notably similar to the Texas statute at issue in an earlier due process
decision, Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See supra text accompanying notes 46-
55.
73. In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court had directed that the Florida statute be
referred for construction to the Florida Supreme Court through its certificatiore process, in
order to decide whether a Florida court would apply the statute to the fact situation posed
by the Clay case. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960). The Florida Supreme
Court found that the Florida statute did apply. 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
74. 377 U.S. at 182.
75. Id. at 183.
76. The same contacts which satisfied due process requirements were found sufficient to
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tinguished the decisions in Dick and Delta as falling short of the
due process threshold requirement of contacts which had been sat-
isfied in Clay."7 Moreover, the Court stressed that there was every
reason for the insurer to expect that such a claim would be gov-
erned by Florida, rather than Illinois, law. The insurer was well
aware that the insured and the property were situated in Florida;
indeed, the policy was issued with full knowledge that coverage
would remain in force if the property were moved to another
state. 8 Since the insurer elected to continue coverage and received
premiums after Clay's move to Florida, the Court found no unfair
surprise from the application of Florida law,79 a relevant considera-
tion in a due process analysis.80 The due process clause, then, re-
quired only that the forum state have sufficient contacts "with the
parties and the occurrence or transaction"81 to make it fair and
reasonable for the state's interests to be furthered by the choice of
its law to be applied.
Recently, both the due process and the full faith and credit re-
quirements for choice of law were raised in a troubling decision in
yet another insurance case before the Supreme Court.
III. THE IMPACT OF Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague8 2
A. The Decision
Ralph Hague was killed in Wisconsin when his son's motorcycle,
on which he was a passenger, collided with an automobile. Neither
driver was insured. Hague did carry uninsured motorist coverage,
however, on each of three vehicles owned by him. The policy was
issued by Allstate Insurance Company, with limits of $15,000 on
the coverage for each of the vehicles.
After her husband's death, Mrs. Hague moved from Wisconsin
meet the demands of the full faith and credit clause. Id.
77. In disposing of the Dick and Delta decisions, the Court said, "Those were cases where
the activities in the State of the forum were thought to be too slight and casual ... to make
the application of local law consistent with due process, or wholly lacking .... No defi-
ciency of that order is present here . . . ." Id. at 181-82.
78. The Clay decision emphasized the fact that the policy was entitled, "Personal Prop-
erty Floater Policy (World Wide)." Id. at 182.
79. See Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate - The Lessening of Due Process in Choice of
Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 889, 904 (1981); see also R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 27, at 508-10.
80. The "unfair surprise" consideration was also given prominent treatment in Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); see infra text accompanying notes 115-19.
81. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 308.
82. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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and became a domiciliary of Minnesota. She was appointed per-
sonal representative of her husband's estate, and brought suit
against Allstate to recover the uninsured motorist benefits under
the policy. While it appeared that Wisconsin law would limit any
recovery to $15,000,3 Minnesota clearly permitted "stacking" of
uninsured motorist limits on multiple vehicle coverages s4 allowing
the Hague estate to recover $45,000.
Allstate contended that Wisconsin law must be applied, inas-
much as the accident occurred there, the deceased and both driv-
ers were domiciled there at the time of the accident, and the policy
in question was delivered there. Nevertheless, the Minnesota court
chose to apply Minnesota law,85 and that judgment was affirmed86
by a sharply divided United States Supreme Court.8 7
The application of its own law by the Minnesota Supreme Court
was challenged on both full faith and credit and due process
grounds. Writing for the plurality,8 Justice Brennan found that
Minnesota had a sufficiently "significant aggregation of contacts
with the parties and the occurrence"8 to render application of its
own law constitutionally permissible under the circumstances. Spe-
cifically, the plurality identified as significant three contacts: the
fact that Hague had been a member of the Minnesota work force
for fifteen years and had commuted to his job daily;9" the fact that
Allstate did business in Minnesota on a continuing basis;9 1 and
Mrs. Hague's post-accident acquisition of a Minnesota domicile
83. The Minnesota Supreme Court was uncertain how Wisconsin law would be applied in
this case. A policy provision forbidding stacking of uninsured motorist policy limits would
have been upheld by Wisconsin law, and the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the
Hague policy as containing such a prohibitory provision; however, it held that such a provi-
sion would not be honored under Minnesota law. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43,
48 (Minn. 1978), aff'd after rehearing en banc, 289 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 1979).
84. This view permitting "stacking" is the majority position in the United States. See
Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d at 50.
85. 449 U.S. at 306-07. See Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 49-50 (Minn. 1978),
in which the Minnesota Supreme Court relied in large part upon application of "the better
rule of law" factor in the analytical framework proposed by Professor Leflar. See R. LEFLAR,
supra note 7, § 107.
86. 449 U.S. at 320.
87. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court in a 4-1-
3 decision. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in the plurality opin-
ion. Justice Stevens concurred in the affirmance in a separate opinion. Justices Powell and
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented. Justice Stewart did not take part in the case.
88. 449 U.S. at 304-20 (opinion by Brennan, J.).
89. Id. at 320.
90. Id. at 313-14.
91. Id. at 317.
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and subsequent appointment as representative of the Hague es-
tate.92 Without distinguishing between the due process and full
faith and credit challenges,9 3 the plurality held that these contacts
gave Minnesota the requisite "state interests"'94 to satisfy constitu-
tional limitations on its choice of law decision.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment of the plurality but
identified separate bases for the satisfaction of the full faith and
credit and the due process clauses.9 5 On the one hand, the absence
of "any direct or indirect threat to Wisconsin's sovereignty"96 ne-
gated any compulsion for Minnesota to accord full faith and credit
to Wisconsin law.9 7 As for due process, Justice Stevens found no
unfairness or unreasonableness in subjecting Allstate to the appli-
cation of Minnesota law.
9 8
Justice Powell's dissent99 focused on a perceived absence of sig-
nificant contacts, either separately or in the aggregate, to satisfy
constitutional limitations on Minnesota's choice of forum law. Jus-
tice Powell viewed this absence of sufficient meaningful contacts as
evidence of a lack of any legitimate forum interest which would be
furthered by the choice of its own law. The lack of such an interest
would require a finding that Minnesota exceeded constitutional re-
92. Id. at 318-19.
93. The plurality opinion recognized the similarity of choice of law limitations under both
due process and full faith and credit, particularly after the demise of the "weighing of inter-
ests" test of Alaska Packers, supra text accompanying notes 29-31. 449 U.S. at 308 n.10.
94. 449 U.S. at 320.
95. Id. at 322. Justice Stevens read the full faith and credit clause as protecting each
state's interest in having its own legitimate interests, its own sovereignty, respected by sister
states. The due process provision, however, was seen by Justice Stevens as guarding against
application of forum law in a manner which would be arbitrary or unfair. Id. at 322-23, 326-
27. For other critical views suggesting separate functions for due process and full faith and
credit in limiting choice of law decisions, see Kirgis, supra note 4; Martin, supra note 4;
Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (1978).
96. 449 U.S. at 325.
97. Because the insurance policy provided coverage for accidents in any state, and there-
fore the insurer knew that in a given situation the law of a state other than Wisconsin might
be applied to construe the contract, Justice Stevens concluded that Wisconsin had no legiti-
mate interest in having its "no stacking" rule applied to this case. It is suggested that this
conclusion may not follow logically. Justice Stevens further concluded that, in the absence
of a Wisconsin interest, "it [was] unnecessary to evaluate the forum State's interest in the
litigation in order to reach the conclusion that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
require the Minnesota courts to apply Wisconsin law.... ." 449 U.S. at 326. This certainly
would be a novel approach to the constitutional standard if it were to become a majority
view.
98. Nor to the law of any other "stacking" state, since the policy would have covered an
accident in any state. 449 U.S. at 327-30.
99. Id. at 332-40.
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strictions in the Hague case. 100
B. Analysis
Significantly, all of the justices who participated in the Hague
decision seemed to agree that the limitations imposed on choice of
law decisions by the full faith and credit clause and the due pro-
cess clause are now to be tested under essentially the same stan-
dard.10 1 Clearly the time has passed when the Constitution would
be interpreted to mandate a single choice of law possibility in vir-
tually every case with multistate features. 10 2 Rather, to "pass con-
stitutional muster," it is sufficient now that the state whose law is
applied have significant contacts "with the parties and the occur-
rence or transaction, 103 sufficient to create legitimate interests in
having its law applied. This single test seems to express the stan-
dard as it has evolved in the full faith and credit realm with Car-
roll,104 and in the field of due process as evidenced by Watson105
and Clay.108
The disturbing aspect of Hague is the plurality's dubious man-
ner of applying this standard. Justice Brennan has taken three
Minnesota contacts, each of rather questionable significance, and,
by the process of "aggregation," has found a measure of "signifi-
cance" sufficient to pass the constitutional threshold. To evaluate
the Court's action, each of these contacts should be considered
separately.
The first contact, considered of great weight by the plurality,
was the fact that Hague was a member of Minnesota's work force
for fifteen years and commuted daily to the forum state in that
100. "Neither taken separately nor in the aggregate do the contacts asserted by the plu-
rality today indicate that Minnesota's application of its substantive rule in this case will
further any legitimate state interest." 449 U.S. at 339 (Powell, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 308 n.10 (plurality opinion); id. at 322 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 332
(Powell, J., dissenting).
102. "Implicit in... [the inquiry in this case] is the recognition, long accepted by this
Court, that a set of facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular issue within a lawsuit, may
justify, in constitutional terms, application of the law of more than one jurisdiction." 449
U.S. at 307 (plurality opinion).
103. Id. at 308.
104. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955). See supra text accompanying notes 38-45.
105. Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). See supra text
accompanying notes 63-70.
106. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964). See supra text accompanying notes
71-81.
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capacity.10 7 While conceding that "employment status may impli-
cate a state interest less substantial than does resident status
. . .," the opinion goes on to note the "police power responsibili-
ties" Minnesota has toward non-resident employees. 08 All these
arguments may be true, but they seem irrelevant when viewed in
light of the issue raised in the Hague case. The extent of uninsured
motorist coverage afforded to Hague has no relationship to his em-
ployment status, nor does it trigger any regulatory interest of Min-
nesota in controlling the details of his employment. Even if Hague
had been commuting to work at the time of the accident, the im-
portance of this contact would have been questionable; 09 as it was,
the contact was insignificant.
It is true, -as the plurality points out, that, for some purposes the
place of employment may be a significant contact. Had the issue in
Hague involved the choice of an appropriate workmen's compensa-
tion statute,110 for example, this contact alone would have been
sufficient to justify application of Minnesota law."' But with re-
spect to the "stacking" issue, Hague's employment status in Min-
nesota is really a "non-contact."
Another contact, Mrs. Hague's move to Minnesota and appoint-
ment as personal representative shortly before filing suit, properly
bears no weight on the issue of the extent of decedent's insurance
coverage.1 12 Moreover, the obvious potential for forum-shopping
makes substantive consideration of such a "contact" both unwise
and dangerous as an invitation to other litigants to seek the same
advantage. 1 3 Prior case law in this area had indicated that such a
107. 449 U.S. at 313-17.
108. Id. at 314.
109. But see Justice Brennan's plurality opinion to the contrary, 449 U.S. at 314: "That
Mr. Hague was not killed while commuting to work or while in Minnesota does not dictate a
different result." See also E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 6, at 86.
110. This was precisely the issue in Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 475-76
(1947), a decision cited by the plurality in support of the significance of the "commute to
work" contact in Hague. 449 U.S. at 314. It is suggested that, while this contact was indeed
significant for the issue posed in Cardillo, it had no real significance in Hague.
111. See also Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
112. The plurality goes out of its way to note that this post-accident change of residence
was not accompanied by any improper motive or desire to facilitate forum shopping by Mrs.
Hague. However, this observation seems to beg the question whether such a post-accident
residence has constitutional relevance in any event.
113. "If a plaintiff could choose the substantive rules to be applied to an action by mov-
ing to a hospitable forum, the invitation to forum shopping would be irresistible." 449 U.S.
at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Lowenfeld & Silberman, Choice of Law and the Supreme
Court: A Dialogue Inspired by Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 14 U.C.D. L. Rzv. 841, 861-
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post-occurrence residency change would not create an interest in
the forum sufficient to permit it to apply its own law.114 Likewise,
there was no significance in the Hague estate's being administered
in Minnesota, other than the fact that Mrs. Hague chose to have
probate take place there. Again, it seems, Justice Brennan seized
on a "non-contact."
Finally, the active business of Allstate in Minnesota was seen as
another contact of significance. This factor supposedly put the in-
surer on notice that it might be subject to Minnesota's law on
stacking of policy limits,115 so that it could not claim unfair sur-
prise at the choice of law decision made by the Minnesota
courts. 6 Yet this position is not persuasive as to why the insurer
should have anticipated application of Minnesota law to a claim
made on a policy issued in Wisconsin to a Wisconsin resident, par-
ticularly for an occurrence which took place in Wisconsin. Both the
plurality" 7 and concurring 18 opinions rely on the Watson and
Clay decisions as support for the significance of the insurer's doing
business in the forum state, because those cases upheld the forum's
choice of its own law despite the policy's having been issued in a
sister state. However, in both Watson and Clay, the loss insured
against occurred in the forum state. It is suggested that the place
where the loss occurred is a major factor distinguishing those deci-
sions from the Hague case. Is it reasonable to assume that an in-
surer can legitimately be subjected to application of the law of any
state where it does business, without some other significant contact
between that state and the transaction sued upon? 119 As shown
62 (1981).
114. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936). The plurality opinion
attempted to distinguish Yates by indicating that that decision had merely found a post-
accident residence change "insufficient in and of itself" to permit application of forum law.
However, the dissenting opinion noted that the Yates decision, in overturning a Georgia
court's application of its own law, found that "there was no occurrence, nothing done, to
which the law of Georgia would apply." 299 U.S. at 182 (emphasis added). Likewise the
dissent cited Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), in which the Court held that such
a post-accident change of residence was "without significance." 281 U.S. at 408. See 449
U.S. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting).
115. 449 U.S. at 317-18.
116. This contact was, in fact, dispositive of the case for Justice Stevens. See id. at 329-31
(Stevens, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 318 nn.24-25.
118. Id. at 328-29 n.20.
119. Indeed, the dissent points out the unrealistic position to which this contention must
lead, since Allstate was in fact doing business in all fifty states at the time of this incident.
See id. at 338 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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above, no other significant contact between Minnesota and this lit-
igation is apparent.
The plurality relies for its finding of constitutionality in Hague,
not on any one of the contacts mentioned above, but upon all of
them - a "significant aggregation of contacts with the parties and
the occurrence." 120 Yet if, upon examination, none of these con-
tacts implicates any legitimate interest by Minnesota in applying
its own law, the logic of finding sufficiency through an aggregation
of these "non-contacts" is debatable. For this purpose, can the
whole be greater than the sum of its parts? Such use of the device
of "aggregation" creates dangerous potential for faulty analysis
and manipulation, which is capable of undermining the effective
use of both full faith and credit and due process as constitutional
limitations on choice of law.
Perhaps the essential flaw in the Court's evaluation of the signif-
icance and sufficiency of the identified contacts lies in the fact that
these contacts were solely with the parties in this case, rather than
with the transaction sued upon.121 The Court has, over the years,
adopted a similar standard for determining whether a forum
state's attempted exercise of long-arm jurisdiction violates the due
process rights of the parties, usually meaning the defendant. Sim-
ply stated, the forum state must have sufficient minimum contacts
with the parties or the occurrence so as to make it fair and reason-
able for the non-resident party to have to appear in a foreign,
often inconvenient, forum to litigate his rights.122 While various as-
pects of the transaction sued upon may properly be considered in
determining whether "minimum contacts" have been satisfied, i.e.,
foreign-based activity causing a forum-based injury,1 23 the judicial
120. Id. at 320. For an excellent discussion of this aspect of the Hague opinion, see Com-
ment, Legislative Jurisdiction, State Policies and Post-Occurrence Contacts in Allstate In-
surance Co. v. Hague, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1134, 1140 (1981); see also R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE,
& H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 451 (3d ed. 1981).
121. To be sure, the plurality opinion indicated that, in order to apply its own law in a
choice of law decision, the forum must have sufficient contacts "with the parties and the
occurrence or transaction." 449 U.S. at 308 (emphasis added). However, as discussed above,
the contacts with the transaction in Hague were, at best, insignificant and, at worst, con-
trived. See supra text accompanying notes 109-21.
122. This standard as expressed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), has not changed significantly in its articulation. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
123. See, e.g., Hardy v. Pioneer Parachute Co., 531 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1976) (parachute
manufactured in Delaware and sold to South Carolina by telephone order, causing injury in
South Carolina where it malfunctioned, held to subject foreign manufacturer to jurisdiction
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jurisdiction inquiry remains directed toward whether the defend-
ant has "purposefully availed" himself of the "benefits and protec-
tions" of the forum state. 124 In other words, the primary focus is on
the contacts between the parties and the forum state.
The Court has stated on several occasions, albeit in dicta, that
the mere presence of judicial jurisdiction does not guarantee satis-
faction of legislative jurisdiction for the forum to apply its own
law, and vice versa. 125 The purposes for each inquiry are different,
though often related; therefore, the emphasis on particular factors,
i.e., contacts, may also be different. Because choice of law decisions
bear on the merits of a suit - the law which will govern rights and
liabilities arising from the transaction or occurrence being sued
upon - it seems appropriate that any full faith and credit or due
process inquiry for legislative jurisdiction purposes should place
primary emphasis on contacts relating to the transaction or occur-
rence. 2 ' The problems encountered in the Hague decision seem to
support such a view. The contacts with Minnesota identified there
related almost entirely to the parties in the suit and not to the
transaction, which was exclusively Wisconsin-based. It is not sug-
gested that the Court return to a constitutionally mandated choice
of law mode, in which a single transactional contact is pre-selected
for each category of case, then imposed inflexibly on the states as
the requisite choice of law rule. However, an action in which legis-
lative jurisdiction is proposed for a state which has essentially no
significant contacts with the transaction or occurrence sued upon,
should be viewed skeptically by the courts. The danger is present,
as in Hague, that none of the so-called "contacts" is of any true
significance in satisfying either the due process or the full faith
and credit clause.
in South Carolina); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (defective water heater safety valve manufactured and installed in
water heater in Pennsylvania, causing explosion and injury in Illinois, held sufficient to up-
hold long-arm jurisdiction in Illinois).
124. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 295; Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S.
84, 93-94 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 216. In the World-Wide Volkswagen deci-
sion, the Supreme Court went to great lengths to emphasize that such contacts as the conve-
nience of a local plaintiff in obtaining relief in the local forum or the forum state's interest
in adjudicating a case involving local injury, were to be considered only after it was shown
that a defendant had availed himself of the benefits and protection of the forum state. 444
U.S. at 295.
125. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317 n.23 (1981); Kulko v. Superior Court,
436 U.S. at 98; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 215; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 254.
126. For an excellent debate on this point, see Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 113.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has wisely moved away from its earlier ef-
forts toward creating a constitutionally mandated choice of law
rule to be imposed on the states under the auspices of the due
process clause and the full faith and credit clause. In so doing, it
has struggled to articulate the standard by which appropriate con-
stitutional limitations may be imposed on choice of law decisions.
While an appropriate standard now seems to be in place, under
which both full faith and credit and due process limitations are
implemented, the Court has left considerable confusion as to how
the standard ought properly to be applied. By what test will the
significance of a contact or group of contacts be judged?
The Hague decision demonstrates that it is all too easy for irrel-
evant factors to be given inordinate significance, thereby permit-
ting blatantly inappropriate choice of law decisions to stand in the
face of constitutional challenge. The pendulum has swung to a
point at which too little control has been retained over a state's
ability to choose its own law to determine the merits of an action,
inviting future instances of parochialism to occur without effective
constraint. With the growth of long-arm jurisdiction, the potential
for abuse will be magnified until the Supreme Court demonstrates
that reasonable controls can be exercised to guard against exces-
sive provincialism in choice of law decisions.
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